Abstract. We outline constructions for both pseudo-random generators and one-way hash functions. These constructions are based on the exact TSP (XTSP), a special variant of the well known traveling salesperson problem. We prove that these constructions are secure if the XTSP is infeasible. Our constructions are easy to implement, appear to be fast, but require a large amount of memory.
Introduction
In some elds of modern cryptography, e.g. public key cryptography, it is common to base the security of cryptosystems on the intractability of well known mathematical problems. Examples for these problems are the factorization of integers and the discrete logarithm. But for the elds of one-way hash functions and secret key cryptography there seems to be no scheme, which has a simple mathematical description, is provably secure under a reasonable assumption and is fast. Merkle and Hellman 8] were the rst to suggest an NP-hard problem for cryptography. They couldn't prove their public key cipher to be as secure as the underlying problem, and later their cryptosystem was broken. In fact it is regarded to be very unlikely, that one can prove the equivalence of breaking a public key cipher and computing some NP-hard problem. Shamir 13] suggested an identi cation scheme based on the NP-hard permuted kernel problem (PKP). For a discussion of the hardness of the PKP see 1], 5] and 11]. Other identi cation schemes based on NP-hard problems were due to Stern, see 14] and 15] .
What about secret key cryptography? Theoretical constructions are known which are as hard to break as any one-way function, though these constructions are too ine cient for practical applications. Furthermore Impagliazzo and Naor 6] did discuss constructions for pseudo-random bit generators and universal one-way hash functions, which are as secure as the Subset Sum problem. This is NP-hard.
A one-way hash function very similar to Impagliazzo's and Naor's scheme was suggested the same year by Damg ard 4]. This was broken by Camion and Patarin 2], using essentially brute force and applying the birthday paradox. We conclude that Damg ard's scheme did not fall due to an inherent feasibility of the Subset Sum problem.
Anyway the Subset Sum problem may be too easy for cryptography. The whole theory of NP-hardness is based on worst-case complexity. Therefore NP6 =P would only imply that Subset Sum is infeasible in the worst case. But even being infeasible on average might be not enough.
Consider a problem P and assume for simplicity, that all instances of size n are equally likely. Let P be hard on average. In other words, the expected runtime for every probabilistic algorithm to solve P, when an instance of size n is randomly chosen, is exponential (in n). There may exist an algorithm, such that, say, for 50% of all instances of size n we need exponential time to solve them, and for the remaining instances we need time n c . The expected runtime for this algorithm is exponential, but a randomly chosen instance is easy with probability 1=2.
In cryptography we demand for any attacker the probability of a successful attack to be negligible. Consequently we also demand that a randomly generated instance of the underlying problem is hard with overwhelming probability|not only hard in the worst case or hard on average.
Empirical results on heuristics for the Subset Sum problem|e.g. by Schnorr and Euchner 12]|raise serious doubts on the security of Impagliazzo's and Naor's schemes. Nevertheless other NP-complete problems can be good cryptographic one-way functions.
The traveling salesperson problem (TSP) is among the oldest and most prominent problems in algorithm and computational complexity theory. It is unsolved if we only regard an e cient algorithm as a valid solution. It has been studied long before the theory of NP-hardness was developed, see 7] for details.
The Exact TSP (XTSP)
Essentially the XTSP is a variant of the TSP, where we are looking for a Hamiltonian path of a given length|not for the shortest one.
In the following A = (a i;j ) is an n n-matrix with a i;i = 0 and for i 6 = j a i;j randomly chosen from f0; : : :; 2 l(n) ? 1g. We think of A as the distance matrix for distances in the complete directed Graph G n with n vertices. Therefore the XTSP is actually a family of problems depending on the parameter l(n).
In this paper we only deal with directed graphs, but our results can easily be adopted to the undirected case too.
We regard the numbers a i;j as xed public constants like, say, the S-boxes of DES.
Any Hamiltonian cycle X for G n can be coded as an integer with dlog 2 ((n ? 1)!)e Bits.
By Length A (X) we mean the length of X with respect to A. Given a number B, the XTSP is to nd a Hamiltonian cycle X with Length A (X) = B:
It is easy to prove the NP-hardness of the XTSP and the NP-completeness of the corresponding existence problem.
By the following theorem we nd a relationship between di erent members of our problem family.
Then the XTSP with number length l 0 (n) can|with respect to probabilistic algorithms and except for a polynomial factor in computation time|be no harder than the XTSP with l(n).
Sketch of proof: For l 0 (n) l(n) log 2 ((n ? 1)!) we regard the di erence matrices A = (a i;j ) and A 0 = (a 0 i;j ) with a 0 i;j a i;j (mod 2 l 0 (n) ): For any random X and B = Length A 0 (X) there exists with overwhelming probability a Y with Length A (Y ) = B. If Y exists, it is a solution with respect to A 0 too.
The proof for l 0 (n) l(n) log 2 ((n ? 1)!) uses the fact, that any solution with respect to the number length l(n) is unique with overwhelming probability. Then any solution for the number length l 0 (n) is|if existing at all|the same as for l(n). u t Thus l(n) log 2 ((n ? 1)!) describes the most secure cases. It seems recommendable to bound l(n) by 1 c log 2 ((n ? 1)!) l(n) c log 2 ((n ? 1)!) for some c > 1, e.g. c = 2.
To get a \more uniform" output we de ne the modular XTSP. Given the matrix A, the number B and the number length l(n), the problem is to nd an X with Length A (X) B mod 2 l(n) :
Theorem2. With respect to probabilistic algorithms, and except for a polyno- 
A Pseudo-Random Generator (PRG)
A PRG uses a short, \really random" input to generate a longer, \randomly looking" bit string S. For a cryptographic PRG it must be infeasible to distinguish between S and a \really random" bit string S 0 , where each bit is generated independently according to the uniform distribution. I.e. there must be no probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, to distinguish between S and S 0 with probability signi cantly greater than 0.5.
Cryptographic PRGs are highly useful for many cryptographic applications. It is straightforward to use them as (secret key) stream ciphers. Then there also exists a polynomial time algorithm D to distinguish with overwhelming probability. We will use D to nd out for any B, if there is an X with Length A (X) = B.
Since l(n) > 1 + log 2 ((n ? 1)!), x is unique with nonnegligible probability. For any i; j, i 6 = j we randomly change a i;j . As in the proof of theorem 3 we get a new distance matrix A 0 . We have Length A 0 (X) = B if and only if the edge i ! j is no part of the Hamiltonian cycle X. In the other case with signi cant probability there is no Y with Length A 0 (Y ) = B. Thus we can use D to nd the edges of X. u t 5 On the Choice of A Before one can apply our schemes, the coe cients a i;j of the matrix A must be xed. We consider two natural ways to do this: 1. Generate n random points in a nite plane (or some higher dimensional space) and compute a i;j as the (e.g. Euclidean) distance between the points i and j. In order to save space one might store the coordinates of the points and compute the distances on demand.
2. Generate the a i;j as independent random numbers from f0; 2 l(n) ? 1g, according to the uniform distribution. Note that the rst option leads to an undirected graph, i.e. a i;j = a j;i . Though we could cope with this, the rst option is not recommendable. It is well known (cf. 3], section 37.2), that, if the triangle inequality holds for a TSP, there is a good deterministic approximation algorithm. But no such algorithm can exist for general TSPs, if NP6 =P. There is no obvious way to make use of the triangle inequality for solving the XTSP. Nevertheless such inherent structures in the matrix A should be considered as possible weaknesses.
The second option forces us to generate and store a large number of random bits. A very convincing way to solve the generation problem is to use the rst l(n)n 2 bits of the binary representation of ? 3. Other mathematical constants would do as well, if the resulting bits appear to be uniformly distributed. 6 How Infeasible is the XTSP?
As outlined in the introduction, we should not trust in the infeasibility of any problem simply because it is NP-complete. The \classical" TSP minimization problem is feasible for dimensions n =\several thousand", see Padberg and Rinaldi 10] . This is alarming! On the other hand there are some reasons to believe that algorithms like Padberg's and Rinaldi's|which seams to be typical for all approaches to solve large-scale TSPs|are of few help for attacks against our cryptographic schemes:
1. The triangle inequality does hold for all solved problems. If the lower bound is too large (or the upper bound too low) then discard S i else apply branch{and{.. . on the solution space S i . Clearly this is e cient if we can discard many subsets S i at a high level of the recursion tree. In our case the target number B is computed as the length of some random Hamiltonian cycle X. Hence we can expect a nonnegligible fraction of all Hamiltonian cycles to be shorter than X and a nonnegligible fraction to be longer. Thus nearly all large subsets S i of the solution space will contain both longer and shorter Hamiltonian cycles and we can discard almost none.
So the XTSP appears to be a variant of the TSP, where branch{and{.. . works exceptionally bad. Nevertheless some further research is necessary before we can suggest \prob-ably secure" values for the parameters n and l(n). The size of these parameters is, of course, essential for the speed of our schemes and for the size of the required memory.
Much more research is necessary before we can recommend our schemes for practical use. Any e ort in attacking the schemes is appreciated!
